CATALYTIC COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION FUNDING PROVISIONS
Hugh Spitzer* and Andy Omara**
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ABSTRACT……………………………. . .……………………………

46

II. INTRODUCTION………………. . .…………………………………. . . 46
III. CONCEPTUALIZING POSITIVE RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT………………. 48
IV. INDONESIA…………………………………………………………… 53
V. WASHINGTON STATE…………………. . .…………………………..

61

VI. KANSAS………………………………. .……………………………. 70
VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS………………………………….78

*

Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law. B.A., Yale University
(1970); J.D. University of Washington (1974); LL.M., University of California at Berkeley
(1982).
**
Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, Gadjah Mada University School of Law, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. S.H., Gadjah Mada University (1996); M. Pub. & Int. Law, University of
Melbourne (2007); Ph.D. Univ. of Washington (2017).

45

46

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
I.

[Vol. 49:45

ABSTRACT

It is well-recognized that it is easier for judges to enforce constitutional “negative rights” provisions than positive social and economic rights. This article focuses on the challenges of enforcing one specific positive right: the constitutional
right of children to attend adequately funded schools. Our article tests on-theground judicial implementation of education funding provisions against the general theoretical framework of judicial interaction with the political branches developed by Katharine Young. We analyze how, in multi-year, multi-decision litigation, constitutional court judges in the three jurisdictions we studied actively
experimented with the challenging task of forcing, or enticing, reluctant legislative and executive branches into spending more on education—often against the
backdrop of potential political retaliation. Focusing principally on Indonesia and
the American states of Washington and Kansas, we found Young’s model helpful
in describing how judges shifted their tactical and rhetorical approaches among
“peremptory,” “managerial,” “experimentalist,” “conversational” and “deferential” modes of review. Our study confirms Varun Gauri’s and Daniel M. Brinks’
observation that “judges . . . craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood of
compliance . . . , the political reaction and its effect on the standing of the judiciary.” These and other social scientists help explain why it is so difficult for
courts to push the political branches to act, particularly when action requires
higher taxes or a redirection of existing funds. We conclude that a court’s approach to judicial review of legislative and executive actions (or inaction) depends on the judiciary’s institutional strength, the remedies sought, and the specific political context within which the judicial review occurs. The three courts
we studied were catalysts in contentious, multi-year education finance cases that
were ultimately successful, in significant part, because of the strong support for
judicial action from civil society groups and the media.
II. INTRODUCTION

Social and economic rights are imbedded in constitutions worldwide. But legal theorists and empirical researchers—to say nothing of politicians—have observed that enforcement of these “positive rights” to government action on
health, education, housing, economic security, and other social goals can be
problematic. This article focuses on one positive constitutional right: the right of
children to attend adequately funded schools. The goal of our study is to test onthe-ground judicial implementation of education funding provisions against a
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general theoretical framework developed by Katharine Young,1 and we also apply the empirical findings in studies edited by Varun Gauri and Daniel M.
Brinks2 and by Malcolm Langford, Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, and Julieta
Rossi.3 Young’s framework and the above empirical studies suggest that when
faced with the task of enforcing positive rights provisions that cost taxpayer dollars, constitutional courts operate in several distinct modalities. Judges use different tactical and rhetorical approaches depending on their institutional strength,
their specific political context, and the remedies being sought. In the words of
Gauri and Brinks, “judges . . . craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood
of compliance . . . , the political reaction and its effect on the standing of the
judiciary. . . .”4 Recent scholarship has also emphasized the importance of the
catalytic role of the judiciary, emphasizing that the judicial branch is most successful in implementing positive constitutional rights when court decisions reinforce sociopolitical factors that independently pressure the executive and legislative branches to act.5
We examined the experience of three jurisdictions with judicial enforcement
of pre-college education rights, looking in depth at judicial enforcement of constitutional requirements for school funding in Indonesia and in and the American
states of Washington and Kansas. We conclude that the model developed by
Young is of great value in describing court actions and judicial interplay with
other governmental branches. Specifically, we found the three constitutional
courts we studied actively shifted back and forth among Young’s stances as they
searched for ways to successfully entice, shame, or force recalcitrant legislators
and executives to act. At the same time, the work of social scientists Gauri and
Brinks; and Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi; is more useful for predicting when a constitutional court will be a successful catalyst in the political process of increasing school funding.
In this article, we review recent theoretical literature and empirical studies that
attempt to describe how constitutional courts6 enforce justiciable positive rights,
See Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 385 (2010);
KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (Oxford U. Press 2012).
2 See VARUN GAURI AND DANIEL M. BRINKS, COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1, 1–38 (Cambridge U. Press 2008).
3 See SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE (Malcolm Langford,
Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito & Julieta Rossi, eds., Cambridge U. Press 2017) [hereinafter
LANGFORD].
4 GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2, at 4.
5 See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 197 (U. Chicago Press 1998) (noting that
“[t]he basic lesson of this study is that rights are not gifts: they are won through concerted
collective action arising from both a vibrant civil society and public subsidy”).
6 In this article, when we use the term “constitutional courts,” we mean both appellate
courts that are formally vested with authority to interpret or apply constitutional provisions, as
1
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focusing particularly on Young’s theory as an analytical paradigm for our observations. Next, we detail specific instances of this type of judicial enforcement in
the three jurisdictions of Indonesia, Washington, and Kansas—a civil law country and two common law states. The frameworks we apply help explain how
constitutional courts that are thousands of miles from one another, with different
judicial selection systems, different legal traditions, and different political circumstances, nevertheless address school finance controversies in remarkably
similar ways. Although enforcement of positive rights can be a lengthy and often
arduous process, strategic maneuvering by judges can result in substantial results. Each of the constitutional courts we studied moved among the modes
Young identifies, experimenting with different enforcement approaches in an attempt to discover what worked best in their specific contexts. Consistent with
the social scientists’ theories, we found that despite legislative foot-dragging,
these courts played a catalytic role in forcing school funding onto the politicians’
front burners while education interest groups and the media successfully pushed
the lawmakers from other directions.
III. CONCEPTUALIZING POSITIVE RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
A 2014 study by Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl, and Evan Rosevear7 observed
that, of 195 national constitutions in the world, 90% contain at least one economic and social right,8 and 158 of those documents (70%) include at least one
expressly justiciable economic and social right.9 There is substantial academic
literature devoted to constitutional education rights around the world,10 including
well as other high courts (e.g., “supreme courts”) that routinely construe or enforce constitutions.
7 See Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 1043, 1050 (2014). See also SOCIAL RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (Malcolm
Langford, ed., Cambridge U. Press 2008). The authors outline a collection of studies that covers almost two thousand decisions on positive rights from twenty-nine jurisdictions.
8 Jung, supra note 7 at 1053.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Flavia Pivesan, Brazil: Impact and Challenges of Social Rights in the Courts,
in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW 182, 188–89 (Malcolm Langford, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); Fernando Basch,
Argentina: Enforcing a Legal Victory for University Access to Education (Case Study, Int’l
Budget P’ship, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2926507 (last visited July 8, 2019); Education, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (Stu Woolman &
Michael Bishop, eds., 2d ed., Juta, 2014) §§ 57.1–57.2, 57-1–57-42; THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
CLASSROOM: LAW AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1994–2008 (Stu Woolman & Brahm
Fleisch, eds., Pretoria U. L. Press, 2009); Cameron McConnachie & Chris McConnachie, Concretising the Right to a Basic Education, 129 S. AFRICAN L. J. 554 (2012); Strategic Litigation
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in the United States.11 As an empirical matter, these provisions tend to appear
more frequently in civil law countries.12 However, Emily Zackin has documented
the strong social and economic rights tradition at the state constitutional level in
the United States,13 and, together with Mila Versteeg, has demonstrated that
American’s national constitution is an oddity in its lack of positive rights as compared with other national constitutions around the globe.14 Justiciability and judicial enforcement are quintessential for the practical implementation of these
social and economic rights. Over the course of the past decade, there has been an
increase in theoretical and empirical studies of court implementation of positive
rights, providing fodder for a robust study of their actualization in jurisdictions
where such rights are constitutionally guaranteed.15
In the introduction to their 2017 study, social scientists Langford, RodriguezGaravito, and Rossi provide an excellent way of organizing the wide variety of
judicial approaches.16 They describe four clusters of systemic variables: legal
variables like the nature and wording of a positive right; the types of litigants
seeking enforcement; the available remedies; and the judicial culture and traditions of the jurisdiction; political variables like the ability and willingness of
governments to implement court rulings; the relationships between the branches
of government; the level of government involved; and whether a defendant is a
Impacts: Equal Access to Quality Education, Open Society Justice Initiative (2017), available
at: https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/strategic-litigation-impacts-equal-accessquality-education [https://perma.cc/Q8WZ-848W] (last visited July 8, 2019) (discussing Brazil, India, and South Africa); Bivitri Susanti, The Implementation of the Rights to Health Care
and Education in Indonesia, in GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2, at 224.
11 There is a massive and growing corpus of academic literature on school funding cases
in the United States. See, e.g., Cathy Albisa & Amanda Shanor, United States: Education
Rights and the Parameters of the Possible, in Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito & Rossi, supra
note 3, at 255; Paula Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63
ALB. L. REV. 1101 (2000); William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of
the Next Generation of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COL. L. REV. 1897 (2017); Julia A.
Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation:
Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C. R. & C. L. 83 (2010).
12 Jung, Hirschl & Rosevear, supra note 7 at 1057–59.
13 EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 2 (Princeton U. Press 2013).
14 Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81
U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1641 (2014). See also David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 850 (2012) (suggesting that the
U.S. Constitution is “becoming increasingly atypical by global standards” as other countries
draft or redraft their constitutions in ways that do not follow the American model).
15 See, e.g., Kent Roach, The Challenges of Crafting Remedies for Violations of Socioeconomic Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 46 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008); GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2;
LANGFORD, supra note 3; INT’L COMM. OF JURISTS, COURTS AND THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES OF JUSTICIABILITY
(2008).
16 LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 3, at 14–15.
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state or non-state actor; socio-economic variables like wealth and wealth disparity; social inequality; ethnic divisions; and public attitudes; and civil society variables including the relationship between litigants, lawyers, and civil society coalitions; as well as access to litigation funding.17
In her work, Katharine Young zeroes in on the variety of styles and approaches
that constitutional courts apply in interacting with the executive and legislative
branches when those courts attempt to enforce positive rights guarantees. In her
2012 book, Professor Young describes five stances used by courts in social and
economic rights cases. She notes that these stances should not be thought of in
terms of strengths and weaknesses because judicial power is inherently “multidimensional” and interactive.18

Young describes these modes of judicial review as follows:
•

Deferential Review, where “the court assumes that
greater decision-making authority is placed on the
elected branches in interpreting economic and social
rights and in determining the obligations that arise.”

•

Conversational Review, in which “the court is instead
reliant on the ability of an interbranch dialogue to resolve the determination of rights.”
Experimentalist Review, “whereby the court seeks to
involve the relevant stakeholders—government,

•

17
18

Id.
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 142 fig. 5.1.
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parties, and other interested groups—in solving the
problem which obstructs a provisional benchmark of
the right.”
• Managerial review, which “occurs when the court assumes a direct responsibility for interpreting the substantive contours of the right and supervising its protection with strict timelines and detailed plans.”
• Peremptory Review, “when the court registers its superiority in interpreting the rights, and in commanding
and controlling an immediate response.”19
Young’s characteristically erudite book details each of these approaches and
provides examples of their use in various countries.20 She emphasizes the highly
contextual nature of judicial responses to positive rights cases and demonstrates
how the judicial approaches not only vary among jurisdictions but within individual courts themselves. A specific constitutional court might assume one or
more stances in a single case, or shift modes based on the efficacy of its interaction with the other branches of government. Young observes that effective
courts have a keen awareness of their political capital in these cases, and that
judges apply that capital differently in different systems and under different circumstances.21 One of the most effective concepts she uses is that of a “catalytic
court . . . one that sees itself in productive interaction with other political and
legal actors.”22 A catalytic court is successful at variously triggering, nudging,
guiding, controlling, or mandating change that is already in process.23 Young
further elaborates on her model, suggesting three overarching “role conceptions” that courts adopt: the “Detached Court” that emphasizes the deferential
and conversational approaches; the “Engaged Court” that focuses on conversational and experimentalist review; and the “Supremacist Court” that takes a
more managerial or peremptory stance.24 Her chart depicting these concepts follows:

Id. at 142.
See generally id. at 143–66 (explaining the approaches toward judicial review and
providing examples that typify each approach in praxis).
21 Id. at 172.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 173–74.
24 YOUNG, supra note 1, at 194 fig. 7.1.
19
20
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25

Young’s book applies these concepts in detail to the implementation of social and economic rights in South Africa (the catalytic approach),26 Colombia
(the judicial supremacy approach),27 India (the “engaged court” approach),28 and
the United Kingdom (the detachment approach).29 She demonstrates how, in
choosing and applying their stances, courts strategically interact with other key
players in government and in civil society.30
The empirical work of Gauri and Brinks31 complements the theories and
research of Katharine Young, and Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi.32
Gauri and Brinks focus on social and economic rights litigation in developing
countries, and their book documents how courts actively interact with the political branches with an eye towards effective results. They write that “judges . . .
craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood of compliance . . . , the political
reaction and its effect on the standing of the judiciary . . . , and the existence of
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

YOUNG, supra note 1, at 194.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 195–96.
GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2.
LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 3.
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a strong litigant who can engage in follow up or bring new cases.”33 Gauri and
Brinks contend that courts address more positive rights claims when the litigants
are “well-organized and well-funded” and that courts are “more effective when
working within, rather than against, the dominant currents in the political and
policy environments.”34 Based on their research and that of other authors in their
book, they conclude that courts acting in this manner “remain pro-majoritarian
actors” and are “more effective when they act well within the political mainstream and with substantial support from other political actors.”35
This article endeavors to detail how constitutional courts acted and interacted in three jurisdictions with respect to a single category of positive rights—
constitutional rights to adequate funding of pre-college education. The three jurisdictions on which we focus, Indonesia, Washington, and Kansas, all have provisions either written or interpreted as “strong rights” that the courts consider
judicially enforceable. We observed all three courts shifting their tactical approaches as they encountered executive and legislative resistance, sometimes
acting deferentially, sometimes engaging in a “conversation,” and at other times
taking “strong court” positions, including “peremptory” actions. As predicted
by Gauri and Brinks, as well as by Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi,
we found that the courts played a catalytic role, with the ultimate success of
school funding litigation dependent on action by civil society groups, the media,
and supporters within the legislative and executive branches. The problem was
real. The political capital to fix the problem was present. The only thing needed
in each instance was a catalyst. This is precisely what the courts functioned to
do.

IV. INDONESIA
Each branch of government appoints three of the nine justices on Indonesia’s Constitutional Court.36 Members must be 55 years old, are appointed to
five-year terms with a maximum of fifteen years total, and must retire at 70 years

GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2, at 4.
Id. at 25–26.
35 Id. at 28.
36 STEFANUS HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: INDONESIA
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUDICIAL HEROES 55 (Routledge, 2018).
33
34
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of age.37 The Court selects its Chief Justice.38 The Constitutional Court reviews
statutes for their constitutionality, settles disputes between state institutions, settles general election disputes, decides on the dissolution of political parties, and
decides if grounds for impeachment exist.39 Statutory challenges are brought
before the Court by citizens individually or public interest groups.40 The Court
can declare a law unconstitutional and void, but it cannot dictate revisions to the
national legislature.41 A separate Supreme Court hears appeals from the general
court system.42
The drafters of Indonesia’s 1999–2002 constitutional amendments provided
for a number of social and economic rights and the Constitutional Court has
addressed many of these provisions in litigation brought since 2003.43 Article
31 (4), the education funding provision with which this article is concerned, includes a very specific directive that “the state shall prioritize the educational
budget by allocating at least twenty percent of the state revenues and expenditures budget and of the regional revenues and expenditures budget in order to
meet the needs for organizing national education.”44 While this is a strong provision that lends itself readily to enforcement, we found that in six cases the
Court interpreted, applied, and enforced that provision in a variety of ways, taking most of the available stances that Young describes.
We analyzed six education funding decisions of Indonesia’s Constitutional
Court between 2005 and 2008, all brought under the provision requiring the state
37 Id. at 56 (citing The Constitutional Court Act of 24/2003, art. 22, amended by the Constitutional Court Act of 8/2011 and further updated by The Constitutional Court Act of
7/2020). See also, UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN
[CONSTITUTION] 1945, art. 24C(3). The 2020 adjustments to the statute lengthened terms and
further insulated Constitutional Court justices from removal by elected officials.
38 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945,
art. 24(c)(4) (Indon.). The Constitutional Court Law has limited the terms of the Chief Justice
and Deputy Chief Justice to two-and-a-half years. The Constitutional Court Act of 24/2003,
Art. 4(3) (Indon.). HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 56.
39 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945,
art. 24(c)(1) (Indon.). Of these five responsibilities, the new court has dealt mainly with judicial review and settling general election disputes.
40 The Constitutional Court Act of 24/2003, Art. 51, amended by The Constitutional Court
Act of 8/2011 (Indon.).
41 The Majelis Permusyarwaratan Rakyat, or People’s Consultative Assembly (“MPR”) is
comprised of two houses: the dominant Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or People’s Representative
Council (“DPR”), equivalent to a house of representatives, and the Regional Representative
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or “DPD”), a “senate” with more limited powers that
represents regional interests.
42 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945,
art. 31(4) (Indon.).
43 A list of many of the Constitutional Court’s decisions is available at HENDRIANTO, LAW
AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at xii–xv.
44 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945,
art. 31(4) (Indon.).
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to prioritize twenty percent of its budget for education.45 The push for meeting
the constitutional funding mandate was backed by established teachers’ and civil
society groups such as the Indonesian Teachers Association (PGRI) and
Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim association in Indonesia (PB NU).46 The
first judicial review of the new right to education funding was brought by teachers and education activists in Education Funding I.47 They questioned the constitutionality of the legislative act elucidating and implementing the education
funding provision of the National Education Law.48 That statute proposed to
gradually increase the pre-university portion of the state and local education
budgets to the required twenty percent.49 The Court in a split decision ruled that
“the 1945 Constitution had expressly determined that an education budget of a
minimum 20% must be prioritized in national and regional budgets, and that
could not be put aside by legislation.”50 They further stressed that “the implementation of this provision [Article 31 (4)] should not be delayed.”51 In its ruling, the Court declared that because the National Education System Act was
inconsistent with the Constitution, it did not have legally binding force.52 Three
Justices53 dissented, stating that “the word ‘incrementally’ in Article 49 of the
statute should not be seen as contradicting Article 31 (4) of the Constitution.”54
The majority in Education Funding I reflected a strong judicial approach that
typifies Young’s “peremptory review.” She describes the model as “closer to
the conventional static model of judicial review that invites either the striking
down of legislation or the upholding of it.”55 That is precisely what the
There had been at least seven petitions submitted based on Art. 31 (4) of the 1945 Constitution. See VERI JUNAIDI, ET AL., THIRTEEN YEARS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S WORK
IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 28 (2016).
46 Putusan Landmark Mahkamah Konstitusi 2003–2007 [Landmark Decisions of the Constitutional Court] 197–98 (2017). Support for increased pre-college education funding came
early from establishment entities and individuals, such as Rector Suyanto of Yogyakarta State
University (UNY). Anggaran Pendidikan Tidak Sesuai Dengan UUD [Budget for Education
is Not in Line with the Constitution], NU ONLINE (Jan. 10, 2004),
https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/1110/alokasi-anggaran-pendidikan-tidak-sesuai-dengan-uu.
47 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 011/PUU-III/2005, https://perma.cc/V568VW2Y. The labels attached to various cases in this article are simply a matter of convenience.
The cases discussed were provided with different sobriquets in other studies. See, e.g.,
HENDRIANTO, supra note 36, 114–16; Andy Omara, Protecting Economic and Social Rights in
a Constitutionally Strong Form of Judicial Review: The Case of Constitutional Review by the
Indonesian Constitutional Court (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington).
48 Act on National Education System 20/2003 (Indon.).
49 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 011/PUU-III/2005, supra note 47, p. 101.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 102–03.
53 Justice Natabaya, Justice Achmad Roestandi, and Justice Soedarsono, id. at 103.
54 Id. at 105.
55 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 1 at 162.
45
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Indonesian court did in Education Funding I: it not only declared that Article 49
(1) of the Education Funding Act was inconsistent with the Constitution, but
went further by declaring the law void.56 The ruling invited no “dialogue” with
the legislative branch; nor did it elaborate on how lawmakers should implement
its result. This was a powerful mode of judicial decision-making, relying on the
“the 1945 Constitution expressis verbis” mandating the minimum twenty percent.57 The immediate effect of this ruling was that the Article 49 (1) of the
National Education System Act could not be implemented as written. This apparently meant the government was required to fulfill the twenty percent budget
for education at once, but that did not happen. The government responded by
increasing the education budget to six percent in the next annual budget,58 a far
cry from the mandated twenty percent.
The government’s minimal response to Education Funding I triggered another petition from teachers and activists. They challenged the constitutionality
of the legislature’s budget action in Education Funding II,59 arguing that the
lawmakers’ response was nowhere close to the constitutionally required minimum. The government countered that it had to consider the budgetary needs for
other public services.60 In another split decision, the Court ruled that the updated
budget law was inconsistent with the Constitution.61 This time, however, the
Court did not declare the law legally void. The majority instead attempted to be
more strategic. It considered the practical consequences of invalidating the
budget and acknowledged that increasing the budgetary allocation for education
meant reducing the allocation for other sectors, thereby creating a situation rife
with “legal uncertainty.”62
The Court’s ruling in this second education case reflected a weaker form of
judicial review based on the justices’ recognition that a direct order to the coordinate branches had fallen flat. Instead, the Court declared that the statute was
inconsistent with the Constitution but declined to invalidate the law.63 The Court
was trying a more “conversational” approach, attempting to engage the legislative branch and giving lawmakers the opportunity to adjust the law. In this more

56 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 011/PUU-III/2005, https://perma.cc/V568VW2Y.
57 UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN [CONSTITUTION] 1945,
art. 31(4) (Indon.).
58 Law 36/2004 increased the budget for education to six percent of the total. Law 36/2004
on the 2005 State Budget.
59 Decision of Constitutional Court No. 12/PUU-III/2005, available at: [https://perma.cc/
N96S-QA8A] (Indonesian original).
60 Id. at 38.
61 Id. at 61.
62 Id. at 62.
63 Decision of Constitutional Court No. 12/PUU-III/2005.
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politically sensitive ruling, the court did not set a deadline or demand a plan.64
Effectively, the Court’s decision bounced the ball back into the legislature’s
court.
Indonesia’s lawmakers responded by nudging the budget allocation from
6% to 9.1% in its 2006 appropriation bill—a 50% increase but still far less than
the constitutionally mandated minimum.65 In response, teachers and other civic
action groups once again challenged the 2006 budget law as unconstitutional
(Education Funding III).66 In another split decision, the Court ruled for the petitioners, confirming that the allocation of 9.1% for education was not in line
with Article 31 (4).67 The majority held that the government should transfer surplus amounts in the state budget to the education budget.68 The Court was now
experimenting from the bench—trying something different to push the executive and legislature forward after prior attempts had failed to catalyze change. In
Stefanus Hendrianto’s words, “the Court refused to declare the Budget Law
2006 unconstitutional but instead issued a directive for the Executive to do
something to fulfill its constitutional mandate.”69 This declaration could be
viewed as an “experimentalist” strategy, putting pressure on the parties (or at
least one of them) to come up with a solution.70 But the Court’s approach this
time around is best understood as a manifestation of Young’s “managerial”
mode: the Court was directing a specific solution by advising a specific remedy,
in this case the movement of funds from the government’s surplus into the
budget for education spending.71
Both the legislature and the executive ignored the Court’s directive to move

Applying Philip Bobbitt’s paradigm, the Indonesian Court in Education Funding II
could be said to have suddenly shifted to a more “prudential” approach, weighing the relative
advantages and disadvantages of invalidating the law in a broader political and economic context. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (Blackwell, 1991).
65 Law 13/2005.
66 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 026/PUU-III/2005, available at: [https://
perma.cc/HB57-3NCN] (Indonesian original).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 86. Two justices concurred (Palguna and Soedarsono), and two dissented (Roestandi and Natabaya). The two concurring Justices took the position that only lecturers and
teachers were appropriate petitioners. One of the dissenters, Justice Roestandi, contended that
the current budget for education, which was less than 20 percent, did not necessarily mean that
it was inconsistent with the constitution. He suggested that the current budget for education
should be left in place and that it “could be increased in the next annual budget.” The other
dissenter, Justice Natabaya, wrote that the budget law was a special law that did not directly
bind the public at large. As a result, the petitioners did not have legal standing to file this
petition to the court. Id. at 97–98.
69 HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 114–15.
70 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012), supra note 1, at 150.
Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 026/PUU-III/2005 (Indon.), supra note 66, at 86.
71 YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012), supra note 1, at 155.
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surplus funds to education spending,72 and this inaction precipitated in a 2006
petition challenging the education allocation in Indonesia’s 2007 state budget,
which had increased the allotment for schools only to 11.8%.73 This time around,
in Education Funding IV,74 the Court unanimously declared the 2007 budget
unconstitutional, holding that the 20% mandate must be fulfilled immediately.75
However, the Court deferred invalidating the entire budget law, proposing instead that the legislature could adjust the appropriation to bring it in line with
constitutional requirements.76 With Education Funding IV, we witnessed Indonesia’s Constitutional Court trying again to persuade lawmakers to “do the right
thing,” recognizing the judiciary’s limited powers over coordinate branches.77
The Court was also receiving pushback from the executive branch, which expressed concern about the trade-offs between education and other key government services.78 The Court ratcheted down from Young’s “peremptory” and
“managerial” modes to a combination of the “experimentalist” and “conversational” approaches.79 The Court did not order action, as it might have done in
the two “supremacist” modes, but rather pointed out the failings of the elected
branches and asked them to devise a solution thereto.
In 2007, the Court received another similar case. There, a number of educational professionals challenged Article 49 (1) of Law 20/2003 in the National
Education System (Education Funding V).80 In this case, the majority held that
“Article 31 Paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution does not explain in detail
everything included in the scope of the education budget of twenty percent

HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 115.
Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 26/PUU-IV/2006, available at:
[https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan026PUUIV06ttgAPBN2007tgl010507.pdf] (Indonesian original).
74 Decision of the Constitutional Court 026/PUU-IV/2006, available at: [https://perma.cc
/8CWM-N5JE] (Indonesian original).
75 Id. at 93, 95.
76 Id. at 94. (Translation by HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 115.)
77 HENDRIANTO, supra note 36, at 115.
78 KOMPAS DAILY NEWS, June 9, 2006, p. 12. “Vice President Jusuf Kalla stated that the
fulfillment of a 20 percent budget for education is a dilemma for the government. He further
explains, ‘Teacher salaries will likely increase but there will be no sufficient budget for road
maintenance, and teachers cannot get decent health service, and the police and army cannot
property maintain law and order. That is the consequence if we fulfill 20 percent at once today.’”
79 See YOUNG, supra note 1, at 147, 150.
80 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [Constitutional Court] 2007, NO. 24/PUUV/2007, https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Putusan
%2024-PUU-V-2007%20_Eng_.pdf. See also Omara, supra note 47, at 160 (labeling this case
“National Education System II” because it was a challenge to the education statute generally
rather than the budget); HENDRIANTO, supra note 36, at 115 (referring to the decision as “National Education Budget IV.”).
72
73
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. . . .”81 The Court declared that “educators’ salaries must be fully considered in
the preparation of the education budget.”82 The majority observed that the government failed to implement the Court’s earlier education funding directives and
predicted that “there would be a continuous violation if the Court consistently
applied the same rules, i.e. excluding the educator salary, in calculating the
budget for education.”83 But instead of consistently excluding the educators’
salaries as a component of the education budget, the Court acted strategically by
granting the petition and explicitly including teachers’ salaries as one of the education budget items.84 After this move, the majority stated quite frankly that
“there was no reason for the government to delay its constitutional duty to
achieve 20 percent budget for education. Justice delayed, justice denied.”85
In Education Funding V, the Court acted strategically to narrow the gap
between the twenty percent constitutional requirement and the adopted budgetary allocation for education. It considered the government’s difficulty in fulfilling the twenty percent appropriation requirement and the possibility of continued violations. The judges set the groundwork for a somewhat more
deferential mode of jurisprudence, while attempting to cover their doctrinal
tracks by declaring the inviolability of the Constitution’s twenty percent mandate. In this decision, we see the Court taking a prudential approach, balancing
the political and economic consequences of its rulings, and weighing the costs
and benefits of its decision in a broader political and economic context.
In one important respect, the combination of lobbying, repeated litigation, and
the Court’s various attempts to strategically develop an effective approach finally
proved fruitful. The 2008 budget law provided 15.6% for education86—a distinct
increase from the 6% appropriated just four years before.87 But 15.6% still falls
short of 20%, and the difference led to yet another round of litigation, this time
apparently resulting in the downfall of the highly respected Chief Justice, Jimly
Asshiddiqie.88 In this sixth petition, the Indonesian Teacher Association (PGRI)
challenged the constitutionality of the 2008 national budget (Education Funding

81 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [Constitutional Court] 2007, NO. 24/PUUV/2007, [3.16.4] https://mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_eng_Put
usan%2024-PUU-V-2007%20_Eng_.pdf.
82 Id. at [3.16.8].
83 Id. at [3.16.9].
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Law 45/2007 on the 2008 National Budget (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara)
Art. 1 (33), (36) (Indon.) and General elucidation of Law 45/2007. Law 45/2007 excludes
teachers’ salaries in calculating budget for education.
87 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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VI).89 The Court’s opinion recounted its prior rulings on the issue since 200590
and noted that lawmakers had repeatedly ignored judicial declarations about the
Constitution’s mandate, stating that:
[T]he Court has given enough time for the lawmakers to establish
a law that guarantee the fulfillment of budget for education as
mandated by the Constitution. Therefore, for the sake of upholding the Constitution as the highest law . . . the Court must declare
that the 2008 Law on National Budget was inconsistent with the
Constitution. 91
The opinion found the lawmakers responsible for these repeated constitutional
violations and demanded that the 2009 budget allocate sufficient funds to the
nation’s education system to meet the full constitutional requirement.92 But the
Court, clearly recognizing the practical realities implicated, allowed the underfunded 2008 budget to stand until the 2009 national budget cycle took effect.93
The Court then warned that it would invalidate the entirety of the national
budget if the 2009 budget proposal failed to meet the constitutional requirement
for education funding.94 What we witnessed here was the Court’s frustration
with its earlier approaches, which were partly—but not sufficiently—successful
at causing the legislative and executive branches to comply with a rather explicit
positive right in Indonesia’s Constitution. In this sixth case, the Court shifted
away from Young’s deferential and conversational modes toward a more managerial approach. At the same time, we surmise that the justices likely believed
that by leaving the 2008 budget in place and handing the solution to legislators,
the judiciary was being sufficiently pragmatic and cooperative.
The results of Education Funding VI were mixed. The good news was that
the 2009 national budget finally reflected a twenty percent allocation to education—with the accomplishment of the constitutional mandate assisted by including teachers’ salaries in the calculation. The not so good news, at least from the
standpoint of Chief Justice Asshiddiqie and his supporters, was that President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono appointed new justices,95 who in turn caused Asshiddiqie’s removal as Chief Justice. Asshiddiqie, who soon resigned from the

89 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia [MKRI] [Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia] 13/PUU-VI/2008, https://perma.cc/4ABK-TMJ4.
90 The four rulings are Court Decision No. 12/PUU-III/2005, supra note 59; Court Decision No. 026/PUU-III/2005 supra note 66; Court Decision No. 026/PUU-IV/2006, supra note
74; and Court Decision No. 24/PUU-V/2007, supra note 80.
91 MKRI 13/PUU-VI/2008, supra note 89 at 100.
92 MKRI 13/PUU-VI/2008, supra note 89 at 101.
93 Id. at 101.
94 Id. at 100–01.
95 HENDRIANTO, LAW AND POLITICS, supra note 36, at 157.
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Court altogether,96 suspected that the change in Court composition and superintendence was engineered in reprisal for his leadership in the strongly worded
Education Funding VI opinion.97 In Hendrianto’s analysis, the “Court had restrained itself in the previous [budget] cases, but in the end, Asshiddiqie failed
to make a prudential judgment and initiated unnecessary confrontation with the
government.”98
In multiple education funding cases, the Indonesian Constitutional Court
recognized its catalytic role and ardently searched for the “right” strategy to push
the coordinate branches into constitutional compliance. We witnessed the Indonesian court trying virtually all of the available modes that Young described,
experimenting with each one and hoping for a successful result. However, insofar as each approach prompted a different reaction from the coordinate branches
of the Indonesian government, it is difficult to definitively conclude which judicial stance worked “best.”
Despite no shortage of setbacks, the litigants and the Court kept pushing,
and the legislative and executive branches gradually came into compliance (or
at least “good enough” compliance). This implementation of a positive right
mandate within a half dozen years is impressive. At the same time, the result
was costly in another way—a significant shake-up in Indonesia’s Constitutional
Court had substantial collateral impacts in other cases.99 The institutional tension between the court on the one hand and the executive and legislative
branches on the other appears to have been a direct result of the fact that fully
funding pre-college education costs money—a lot of money. Although the executive and legislative branches gradually increased school funding in substantial amounts, some were resentful of being pressured so directly by the judiciary,
and this had serious repercussions for the Constitutional Court.100

V. WASHINGTON STATE
A distinctive feature of American state constitutionalism is that many state
constitutions are interpreted by elected judges.101 In most states, judges are either directly elected, or appointed but then required to stand either for reelection
Id. at 159.
Id. at 115–16, 157–58.
98 Id.
99 The impact of Asshiddiqie’s removal as Chief Justice and his subsequent resignation
from the Court comprises a major portion of Hendrianto’s book. See HENDRIANTO, supra note
36, at 105. It is also reflected in Omara’s analysis of later changes in the Court’s mode of
judicial behavior and analysis. See Omara, supra note 47.
100 See, notes 60 and 78, and accompanying text.
101 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 122 (1998).
96
97
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or for voter approval in a “retention election.”102 As discussed below, this feature of America’s state judicial selection puts pressure on judges when they
make constitutional rulings disliked by certain political actors or groups.103
Washington State is typical in having an elected State Supreme Court.104
Like many American state courts, Washington’s Supreme Court does not hesitate to strike down statutes it finds violative of constitutional provisions.105 But
Washington’s constitutional school funding cases encountered considerably
more difficulties in implementation, bringing “the court into protracted conflict
with other branches and with organized political groups.”106
Washington State has one of the strongest constitutional mandates for precollege (“K-12”) education in the United States. Eleven states require the provision of a “thorough and efficient” system of public schools,107 and several others
mandate a “general and uniform system” of public schools.108 Washington’s robust 1889 constitution provides far more substance, with Article IX, Section 1
noting that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.”109 The explicit nature of
Washington’s constitutional language, designating “ample provision for . . . education” as the “paramount duty” of the state, is a distinguishing factor in Washington’s education funding caselaw. In other jurisdictions, litigation in the 1970s
102 For state-by-state summaries of judicial selection, see Methods of Judicial Selection,
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selectio
n_of_judges.cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/G7HG-5FT4] (last visited April 4, 2019). Only a
dozen American states appoint their highest appellate courts with no electoral participation.
103 See infra notes 158 and 214–215 and accompanying text.
104 WASH. CONST. art. IV, §3.
105 See, e.g., Dearle v. Frazier, 173 P. 35 (Wash. 1918) (noting that “[t]o give credit in
public schools for study of historical, biographical, narrative, and literary features of Bible
pursued under sectarian agents is to give credit for sectarian teaching and influence contrary
to Const. art. 9, § 4.”); Culliton v. Chase, 25 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1933) (holding “graduated income
tax statute . . . unconstitutional” because “[i]ncome is ‘property’ within Constitution requiring
uniform taxation, and tax on income is tax on property and is not ‘excise tax.’”); State ex rel.
Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 200 P.2d 467 (Wash. 1948) (adhering to the principle that “[l]aws enacted in violation of constitutional provision that no bill should contain
more than one subject, which should be expressed in title, will be declared void.”); Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989) (holding that “[s]tatute placing limit on noneconomic damages recoverable by personal injury or wrongful death plaintiff violates state
constitutional right to trial by jury”).
106 Cornell W. Clayton & Gerry Alexander, Washington’s Constitution: The Politics of
State Constitutional Interpretation, in GOVERNING THE EVERGREEN STATE: POLITICAL LIFE IN
WASHINGTON 147 (Cornell W. Clayton et al. eds., Wash. St. Univ. Press ed. 2018).
107 See Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUCATION
JUSTICE (Jan. 2011), http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/State%20Constitution%20
Education%20Clause%20Language.pdf.
108 Id.
109 WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1 & 2 (emphasis added).
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and 1980s relied on Equal Protection claims under the 14th Amendment110 and
on arguments that school finance systems did not meet individual state constitutional mandates for “adequate,” “thorough,” or “efficient” education.111 Nationwide, American education finance litigation since the late 1980s has focused
on the perceived “adequacy” of school funding under state constitutional requirements.112 But Washington’s distinctive “paramount duty” provision generated an atypically strong directive in the Washington Supreme Court’s 1978
case, Seattle School District v. State.113
Seattle School District resulted from two failed attempts by Seattle’s school
district to obtain local voter approval of a special tax levy for the fiscal year
1975–1976.114 Upon review of the case, the Court first underscored its “ultimate
power to interpret, construe and enforce” the state constitution.115 It then held
that despite the state’s argument to the contrary, Article IX, Section 1 of Washington’s constitution was a mandatory, “judicially enforceable affirmative
duty,”116 a duty that was “supreme, preeminent or dominant.”117 The opinion
held that education funding could not rely on local tax revenues,118 but instead
the state government was obligated to amply provide for basic education costs
through “dependable and regular tax sources.”119
In Seattle School District, Washington’s Supreme Court firmly asserted its
authority to define the constitutional positive right to ample education funding
and to broadly outline the appropriate legislative response, exhibiting aspects of
Young’s “supremacist” judicial approach. But the court backed away from supervising the legislature. Instead it took what Young might label an “experimentalist” tack, leaving to the lawmakers the responsibility of solving the problem.
In other words, the Court exhibited tough talk but deferred the solution to the
legislators. This judicial tactic was perhaps due to the vehemence of the state’s
argument that school funding was at root a political question, coupled with the
Washington court’s inexperience with enforcing a strong positive rights provision. The Washington legislature did proceed to develop a clear definition of
“basic education” and substantially increased state funding. The legislators had
110 Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 11, at 90–92; Koski, supra note 11, at 1902–03; Peter
Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 101, 125–26 (1995).
111 Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 11, at 92–94.
112 Koski, supra note 11, at 1904–05.
113 Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
114 Id. at 78.
115 Id. at 83.
116 Id. at 85–87, 91 (in his majority opinion, Justice Stafford expressly referred to and applied American legal philosopher Wesley Hohfeld’s conception of duties and correlative
rights).
117 Id. at 91.
118 Id. at 99.
119 Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d at 97.
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already defined basic education and revised local school funding in 1977,120 after the superior court ruling in Seattle School District but before the state supreme court’s decision.121 The legislators increased funding for public schools
over the ensuing years, but increases were by no means consistent, due in part
to a failure on the legislature’s part to account for inflation.122
Washington’s basic educational model was adjusted over the years.123
Pushed by educators, education lobbying groups, the press, and the public,124
the legislature and a Commission on Student Learning it created in 1993125 developed more precise academic benchmarks126 and statewide assessment
tests.127 The legislature also sponsored studies to determine the financial costs
of bringing Washington students into compliance with those requirements, particularly with respect to the “Washington Learns” project mandated in 2005.128
The Washington Learns report outlined specific actions to enable the bulk of
Washington students to attain a level of academic preparedness for competition

Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606.
Daniel Stallings, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K-12 Schools: Where the Legislature
Went Wrong and What it Should Do to Meet its Constitutional Obligation, 85 WASH. L. REV.
575, 584 (2010). The 1977 enactment of the Basic Education Act seems to have had little
impact on the court. However, Justice Utter, in his concurrence, stated that the court’s approach to enforcement should be limited “due to the vigor with which the legislature addressed
its responsibility through the school finance legislation of 1977.” Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State,
585 P.2d at 109–10.
122 Following the Seattle School District decision, Washington’s biennial state budgets for
K-12 education increased in double-digit percentages from the 1979–1981 through the 19911993 biennia. It then dropped to single digit increases in the biennia between 1993-1995 and
2003-2005, then edging up again for two biennia (perhaps in response to the McCleary litigation). McCleary v. State of Wash., 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012). In the 2009–2011
biennium it declined precipitately, dropping by 2.6% in the 2009-2011 biennium when compared with the previous biennium. Omnibus Operating Budgets 1979-81 Through 2019-21
(Legislative Evaluation & Accountability Program Committee, June 6, 2019), available at
https://perma.cc/KUT9-EJRJ.
123 Stallings, supra note 121, at 586–87.
124 Telephone interview with Ross Hunter, Secretary of the Washington State Department
of Children, Youth, and Families and former legislator (July 17, 2019).
125 Basic Education Act of 1993, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 1293 (Ch. 336 §202(1)).
126 Stallings, Washington State’s Duty, supra note 121, at 585. These “Essential Academic
Learning Requirements,” or EALRs, were mandated by the Basic Education Act of 1993, 1993
Wash. Sess. Laws 1293 (Ch. 336 §202(3)(a)).
127 The Basic Education Act of 1993 also charged the Commission on Student Learning to
develop an updated assessment system. Basic Education Act of 1993, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws
1293 (Ch. 336 §202(3)(b)). These “Washington Assessments of Student Learning, or
WASL’s, were adjusted in the “Academic Achievement and Accountability Statute,” 1999
Wash. Sess. Laws 2142 (Ch. 388).
128 The Comprehensive Education Study Steering Committee, popularly known as “Washington Learns,” was created by 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 2277 (Ch. 496 §2).
120
121
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in the modern knowledge and skills marketplace.129 Legislative sponsors of the
study were fully aware that it might create the basis for new school funding
litigation.130 In order to propel the state to move more swiftly in increasing its
school funding allocations, Mathew McCleary et al. v. State of Washington was
filed in January 2007 by parents, children, education advocacy groups, the
teachers’ union, and a coalition of public school districts.131 At the time, the
2007 legislature was already engaged in education system reforms.132 However,
the primary action that year was the creation of yet another committee, the Basic
Education Finance Task Force, to develop a comprehensive formula to finance
the programs recommended by Washington Learns.133 The Task Force’s 2009
report detailed the specific changes in education programing, staffing, and funding required to achieve the goals the legislature and its various commissions had
set earlier for the state’s education system.134 The legislature responded by
adopting a significant education reform bill redefining “basic education” and
detailing minimum instructional offerings135 but it fell short of funding those
reforms.136 This provided additional ammunition to the McCleary petitioners.137
The McCleary petitioners contended that, notwithstanding the legislature’s
repeated adoption of education standards and goals, the funding continued to
fall short of the state’s paramount constitutional duty “to make ample provision
for the education of all children.”138 In their petition, the McCleary plaintiffs
raised issues concerning the constitutional meaning of “ample” funding and the
word “education;” whether the state was complying with its legal duty as framed
by these requirements; and what the courts ought to do to enforce that duty.139
The trial court found that the state was out of compliance with its constitutional
duty, and, relying heavily on the legislature’s own actions to establish minimum
instructional offerings and funding allocations, held that state funding was “not

129 Wash. Learns, World-class, Learner-focused, Seamless Education, Report of the Comprehensive Education Study Steering Committee (Nov. 2006), https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/public/legacy/reports/WALearnsFinalReport.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2019).
130 Interview with Ross Hunter, supra note 124.
131 Petition for Declaratory Judgment Enforcing Our Constitution, Matthew ex rel. Kelsey
v. Washington, No. 07-2-02323-2 SEA, (Wash. Super. Ct. King Cty. Jan. 11, 2007),
https://perma.cc/PSH6-85UP.
132 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 1826.
133 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws 1823.
134 Joint Task Force on Basic Education Finance, FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE
ON BASIC EDUCATION FINANCE (Jan. 14, 2009), http://leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/Archive/B
EF/Documents/FinalReport.pdf.
135 Sec. 104(1), 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331 (Ch. 548) (also known by its bill number,
ESHB 2261).
136 McCleary v. State of Wash., 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, 242 (2012).
137 Interview with Ross Hunter, supra note 124.
138 WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
139 McCleary, supra note 136, at 244–45.
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ample,” “not stable,” and “not dependable.”140
The Washington Supreme Court substantially upheld the trial court’s decision. The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Debra Stephens, engaged in a selfconscious discussion of positive and negative rights.141 She wrote that the “distinction between positive and negative constitutional rights is important because
it informs the proper orientation for determining whether the State has complied
with its . . . duty in the present case.”142 Justice Stephens quoted New York University Law Professor Helen Hershkoff,143 observing that while with negative
rights the court’s inquiry would be whether the state had overstepped its bounds,
with positive constitutional rights, a court “must ask whether the state action
achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally prescribed
end.’”144 Stephens’ opinion then warned that cases under the education clause
“have always proved difficult. If nothing else, they test the limits of judicial
restraint and discretion by requiring the court to take a more active stance in
ensuring that the State complies with its affirmative constitutional duty.”145 The
opinion held that the legislature, through its commissions, studies, standards,
and various statutes, had identified the resources needed to give all students an
opportunity to meet those standards.146 “Yet substantial evidence shows that
state allocations have consistently fallen short of the actual cost of implementing
the basic education program.”147 The Court ruled that the state had failed in its
constitutional duty to “make ample provision” for educating its children.148 The
Court noted that the responsibility for devising the means of discharging the
constitutional duty is best left with the legislature,149 but declined to entirely
defer to the lawmakers, recognizing the danger that the legislature had already
failed to meet this responsibility and may continue to fall short of the full fulfillment of its duties.150 Accordingly, the state supreme court retained jurisdiction for oversight purposes, asked for “dialogue and cooperation between coordinate branches of state government” in developing a funding reform program,
and called upon the parties to prepare detailed proposals on how the state should
go about meeting the constitutional mandate.151
The Washington State Supreme Court thus positioned itself to engage in
Id. at 269.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 245 (citing to Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999)).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 240–44, 254–57.
147 Id. at 257.
148 Id. at 258.
149 Id. at 245.
150 Id. at 261.
151 Id.
140
141
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what Young would call a “conversationalist” or “experimentalist” process with
the legislature and the executive, looking for a give-and-take that would lead to
an effective and substantial school funding program. But as it turned out, that
conversation would continue for six and a half years, involving seven rounds of
legislative action (or inaction), report-filing with the court, written and oral arguments, and nine major court orders. Limited by its institutional customs, the
Court found that it could “converse” with the state only through questions at oral
arguments and subsequent judicial orders, and the inability of lawmakers to engage in negotiations with the state judges frustrated members of the legislature.152 By all accounts, the process of enforcing the state’s constitutional mandate proved far more onerous than the Court had initially anticipated.
The fundamental problem the Washington Supreme Court encountered in
enforcing the McCleary decision was that the state legislature responded slowly,
in substantial part because of lawmakers’ unwillingness or inability to raise
taxes. During most of the period between the initial McCleary judgment on January 5, 2012, and the court’s final order on June 7, 2018, the legislature was
under divided political control, with the House of Representatives led by Democrats and the Senate dominated by a Republican-led coalition.153 To the surprise of no one, the two houses found it difficult to agree on funding solutions.
Republicans were reluctant to raise taxes, and Democrats were loath to cut programs.154 Some Republican legislators retaliated against the Court, disinviting
the Chief Justice from giving her customary “State of the Judiciary” address155
and threatening to reduce the Court’s size.156 When in 2014 the Court held the
state in contempt for failure to act expeditiously, and then in 2015 added a
$100,000 per day penalty to spur legislative action, nineteen members of the
152 Interview with Washington Supreme Court Justice Barbara Madsen in Tacoma, Wash.
(June 24, 2019); Interview with Washington State Senator David Frockt in Seattle, Wash.
(June 25, 2019); Interview with Washington State Senator Jamie Pedersen in Seattle, Wash.
(July 8, 2019); Interview with Ross Hunter, Secretary of the Washington State Department of
Children, Youth, and Families and former legislator, in Seattle, Wash. (July 17, 2019); Interview with Washington Supreme Court Justice Debra Stephens in Olympia, Wash. (July 18,
2019); Interview with Washington Supreme Court Justice Charles Johnson in Olympia, Wash.
(August 14, 2019).
153 Party Control of Washington State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, available at https://ball
otpedia.org/Party_control_of_Washington_state_government [https://perma.cc/G4LE-BP5F]
(last visited May 15, 2019).
154 Interview with Washington State Senator David Frockt in Seattle, Wash. (June 25,
2019).
155 Interviews, supra note 152; See also, Joseph O’Sullivan, Lawmakers Nix the Session’s
State of the Judiciary Speech, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 29, 2014, available at http://blogs.seattleti
mes.com/politicsnorthwest/2014/12/29/lawmakers-nix-the-sessions-state-of-the-judiciaryspeech/ (last visited July 10, 2019).
156 Legislative
Assaults on State Courts—2019, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE, Feb. 11, 2019, available at https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/legislativeassaults-state-courts-2019 [https://perma.cc/8J64-C52T] (last visited July 9, 2019).
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Senate Republican-controlled majority caucus collectively declared “[t]his extraordinary order presents a clear threat to our state legislature as an institution,”
violated the state and federal constitutions, and threatened a challenge under the
federal “republican-form-of-government” clause.157 The following year there
was a vigorous conservative challenge to three sitting justices, based primarily
on their rulings in McCleary and other school funding cases. Notwithstanding
the conservative barrage, all three judges received solid support from the electorate, materially strengthening the Court’s hand going forward.158
The back-and-forth between the legislature and the Court continued year
after year, with the legislature resisting a complete solution, yet gradually increasing funding under pressure from the judiciary and the public at large. During this process, the court earnestly (and impatiently) searched for a way to enforce its orders, quizzing the parties about possible measures such as
invalidating some or all tax exemptions, or invalidating the entire operating
budget.159 This tug-of-war between the judiciary and the legislature lasted more
than six years, with the state’s education budget slowly increasing until the process finally concluded on June 7, 2018. In 2017, the legislature finally enacted
a budget that substantially increased school funding. On June 7, 2018, the Court
finally declared the case done, announced that the state had finally “complied
with the Court’s orders to fully implement its statutory program of basic education,” terminated jurisdiction, and lifted the contempt sanctions it had previously
imposed in 2015.160 The plaintiffs and their supporters from the teachers’ union
and civic groups were not entirely satisfied, arguing that the funding still fell
short of the need and that the tax levy burdens had been unfairly distributed

Senator Mike Padden, Open Letter from members of the Majority Coalition Caucus
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/5SHB-JLVU (Letter from Senator Mike Padden and eighteen senate Republican colleagues), available at: https://perma.cc/5SHB-JLVU. Ironically, as
the McCleary litigation drew to a close, Republican legislators were quite willing to take credit
for the large infusion of new funds into the school system. See, e.g.,
http://johnbraun.src.wastateleg.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2017/10/Economic-SenseK-12-Funding-Infusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9WX-JUSN] (last visited July 11, 2019).
Twenty-two Senate Democrats responded: “Whether or not we agree with the approach that
the Court has taken, we all agree that our focus should be on improving our public schools
now, not wasting taxpayer dollars on litigation to delay or avoid that duty.” Senator Jamie
Pederson, Legislative Plan for Education Funding, (Sep. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/Q9G9G8K8 (Letter from Senator Jamie Pedersen and 21 senate Democratic colleagues), available
at https://perma.cc/Q9G9-G8K8.
158 Washington Supreme Court Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, available at https://ballotpe
dia.org/Washington_Supreme_Court_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/JY95-TS8F] (last
visited July 9, 2019).
159 See infra note 158 and accompanying test.
160 Supreme Court Order at 4, McCleary, et al. v. State of Washington, No. 84362-7 (Wash.
June 7, 2018).
157
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among school districts within the state.161 Some legislators viewed the 2018
school funding mechanism as somewhat ad hoc and observed that capital funding and special education issues had not been fully resolved.162 Nevertheless,
the Court’s members concluded that they had pushed hard enough, given that
between 2012 and 2019, the legislature had more than doubled the state’s budget
for K–12 funding from $13.5 billion to $27.3 billion per biennium.163
The McCleary process—however long, contentious, and messy it may have
been—can be regarded as a success in enforcing positive rights. It took a substantial time, resources, and political capital and saw no shortage of political
headaches. But ultimately the Court’s steady pressure—cajoling lawmakers,
shaming them, speculating in orders about potential Draconian measures to seize
public funds or shut the schools but always exercising restraint—turned out to
be effective. The Court’s members understood that there were practical limits to
judicial orders, with the danger that legislators would choose to ignore the
court’s dictates. But the judiciary’s approach was aided substantially by consistent support from the media and various civil society groups; by influential
legislators who wanted to carry out the Court’s orders; and by the simple fact
that when challenged at the polls for enforcing the state constitution’s education
funding provision, the challenged incumbents all received public backing.164 In
this regard, the Washington court was supremely catalytic. It deftly toggled back
and forth among the approaches depicted by Katharine Young, exhibiting both
conversational and managerial characteristics, and constantly experimented.
Young characterizes the experimentalist approach as being one in which the
court involves the stakeholders (the government, the parties, and other interested
groups) in solving the problem.165 Washington’s justices were definitely
161 Interview with Washington State Senator David Frockt in Seattle, Wash. (June 25,
2019); Interview with Washington State Senator Jamie Pedersen in Seattle, Wash. (July 8,
2019); Neal Morton, We’re Screwed.’ Some School Districts Feel like Losers in New SchoolFunding Scheme, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018), available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/cont
ent/publicupload/eclips/2018%2002%2002%20We%20re%20screwed%20Some%20school
%20districts%20feel%20like%20losers%20in%20new%20school%20funding%20scheme
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K8A-MTA9] (last visited July 11, 2019).
162 Interviews, Id. The 2019 legislature took measures to relieve the financial stress on
some of the districts that had been caused by the 2018 adjustments to the school levy and
funding mechanisms. See, Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington Lawmakers Struck Deal on Schools
and Property-Tax Levies; Here’s How it Pencils Out, SEATTLE TIMES (April 30, 2019), available at https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-legislature-passes-anew-two-year-state-budget-and-other-key-bills-in-last-minute-frenzy/
[https://perma.cc/PB4W-DW4J] (last visited July 10, 2019).
163 Those amounts are in nominal dollars. Omnibus Operating Budgets 1979-81 through
2019-21, supra note 122. As detailed in that document, in constant dollars, the state budget
for K-12 schools from 2012 to 2019 increased by fifty percent. See also, Table 4, below, “Education Funding Increases During Litigation.”
164 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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experimentalist when searching for an appropriate remedy for the chronic legislative inaction with which they were confronted. Indeed, one legislator described the Court’s behavior as “schizophrenic.”166 After each legislative session, the Court requested briefings from the parties as well as amicus briefs and
asked for guidance in oral arguments where the justices grilled the parties about
the range of enforcement options.167 While this likely was an “experimentalist”
quest for suggestions on the scope of the court’s enforcement powers, it served
to heighten pressure on legislators to act. Once the court had decided how to
proceed with respect to the latest update from the legislature, it would act managerially. But all the while it asserted that it was actually being deferential and
reiterated that specific solutions were up to the lawmakers or that the legislature
and the commissions it created had already determined what it would take to
“amply fund” basic education statewide. As reflected in the McCleary decision,168 oral arguments, and myriad judicial orders, the state justices were intensely cognizant of the pitfalls in enforcing a positive rights provision that costs
substantial taxpayer dollars. But this awareness helped them gradually develop
a strategy of restraint with pressure that was eventually successful. Nevertheless,
by slowly but surely increasing the pressure applied from the bench, the judiciary was ultimately able to catalyze progress.

VI. KANSAS

The Kansas Constitution’s education funding language differs from Washington State’s in a number of ways.169 However, the broad trajectory of Kansas
school funding litigation resembles Washington’s experience, featuring a similar multi-year ping pong match between the state’s supreme court and legislature. The lengthy and tense interaction between the judicial and other branches
has been carefully documented by University of Kansas Law Professor Richard
Interview with State Senator Jamie Pedersen, in Seattle, Wash. (July 8, 2019).
Video recordings of the oral arguments before the Washington State Supreme Court in
the McCleary case are available at https://www.tvw.org/archives/?term=mccleary+oral+argu
ment&search-archives=1#page-1 and https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/SupremeCourt/?fa=supremecourt.McCleary_Education (which also includes links to court filings in the case. (Last visited July 10, 2019). Although in oral arguments Washington’s justices prodded petitioners’ counsel to choose one or another recommended specific sanctions
against the state (e.g., closing the schools, prohibiting non-school expenditures, or blocking
tax exemptions) the petitioners avoided opting for any particular approach for fear that the
court might reject it—resulting in less of “an in terrorem threat hanging over the legislature’s
head.” Public Presentation by Thomas Ahearne, lead counsel for the McCleary petitioners,
University of Washington College of Education in Seattle, Washington (October 14, 2019).
168 See supra notes 139–44 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 109 and infra note 176 and accompanying text.
166
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E. Levy and others.170
Kansas selects justices through a merit selection process.171 Each time a vacancy occurs, a nonpartisan commission nominates three potential appointees
for the governor, who selects one of them.172 The appointee must stand for voter
approval at the next general election, and if retained, that justice is subject to
periodic retention elections.173 Because Kansas historically has been Republican
in its political leanings,174 the Kansas supreme court has been conservative in its
outlook—though moderately so.175 As discussed below, the Kansas Supreme
Court, in two clusters of cases over more than fifteen years, worked conscientiously to enforce the state constitution’s education funding provision. In its efforts, the Court encountered sharp resistance and barely veiled threats from
some legislators. Nevertheless, the justices, spurred on by a strong showing of
support from the media and the public at large, steadily pushed lawmakers toward action on issues of school funding.
The aforementioned litigation involved two key positive rights allocations
in the state’s constitution. Article 6, Section 1 requires that the legislature “shall
provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement” by
establishing and maintaining public schools. Article 6, Section 6(b) provides
that: “[t]he legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the education
interests of the state.”176 That “suitable provision” language was at the core of

Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021 (2006); Richard E. Levy, The
War of Judicial Independence: Letters from the Kansas Front, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 725 (2017);
Richard E. Levy, Update on Judicial Independence in Kansas (CLE at KU Law materials, May
18-19, 2017), available at https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/recent-developments/2017/levy-materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENJ8-RRQZ] (last visited July 11, 2019);
John Robb, Alan Rupe & Jessica Skladzien, The Current State of School Finance in Kansas:
The Kansas Legislature’s Occasional Negative Approach to its Positive Constitutional Duty,
27-SUM KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 329 (2018); Robert Hoeven, Kansas Public School Funding:
Problems and Possible Solutions, 87 UMKC L. REV. 411 (2019).
171 Kan. Const. Art. 3, §5(a).
172 Id.
173 Kan. Const. Art.3, §5(c).
174 Francis Heller and Paul D. Schumaker, The Kansas Constitution: Conservative Politics
Through Republican Dominance, in GEORGE E. CONNOR AND CHRISTOPHER W. HAMMONS,
THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 490 (U. OF MISSOURI PRESS, 2008).
175 See, Ballotpedia, Political Outlook of State Supreme Court Justices, 2012, available at
https://ballotpedia.org/Political_outlook_of_state_supreme_court_justices,_2012
[https://perma.cc/RKK9-NVDL] (last visited June 5, 2019). Despite the use of a “nonpartisan”
judicial selection process, “persons identified with the Democratic party do not enter the procedure when the ultimate choice is to be made by a Republican governor, and vice versa.
Judicial selection has thus not been depoliticized . . . .” FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS
STATE CONSTITUTION 82 (OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, 2011).
176 KAN. CONST. Art 2, §6(b).
170
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the multi-year litigation to adequately fund Kansas schools.177
Kansas school-funding litigation stretches back to 1991, when a district
court ruled that the state’s funding system fell short of the constitutional mandates of adequacy and equity. 178 The court then postponed proceedings to enable the legislature to act. In 1992, legislators reorganized the state’s school funding system by adopting the School District Finance and Quality Performance
Act (frequently referred to by the less than ideal acronym “SDFQPA”).179 Eight
years later, consultants John Augenblick and John Meyers, commissioned by
the state legislature, found Kansas was $800 million short of the amount needed
for an adequate education system (the “A&M Study”).180
The A&M Study was soon followed by the Montoy litigation, consisting of
four state supreme court decisions between 2003 to 2006.181 Montoy I, in 2003,
held that school funding lay with the legislature. However, after a trial on remand, the district court ruled that Kansas’s school funding system violated constitutional guarantees. The second, third, and fourth Montoy decisions followed
in rapid succession, reacting to legislative attempts to address the Supreme
Court’s holdings that state funding was insufficient.182 At one point, when Montoy III’s court deadline for an additional $148 million appropriation passed without legislative compliance, the court set a hearing to determine if the entire Kansas school system should be closed.183 Emotions were running high, but the
legislature blinked and approved the funds.184 After another legislatively commissioned study led to $466 million in increased funding over three years, the
2006 case Montoy IV found that the increased appropriation substantially complied with constitutional requirements.185

177 Part of the Kansas school funding litigation involved equal protection arguments. This
article focuses solely on the positive Kansas constitution’s “suitable provision for finance”
requirement.
178 A still-earlier Kansas school funding case was Caldwell v. State, in which a Johnson
County District Court judge southwest of Kansas City held that the education funding systems
violated the state’s equal protection clause. This led the legislature in 1973 to adopt the School
District Equalization Act. Robb, et al., supra note 170, at 334.
179 Ch. 280, 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 1691. See Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra
note 170, at 1034.
180 Robb et al., The Current State of School Finance, supra note 170, at 336.
181 Montoy v. State (Montoy I), 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003); Montoy v. State (Montoy II), 102
P.3d 1160 (Kan. 2005), republished with concurrence 120 P.3d 306 (2005); Montoy v. State
(Montoy III), 112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005); Montoy v. State (Montoy IV), 138 P.3d 755 (Kan.
2006).
182 See Table 3 infra.
183 Robb et al., The Current State of School Finance, supra note 170, at 337; Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 170, at 1046.
184 Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 170, at 1046–47.
185 Montoy IV, supra note 181, 138 P.3d at 763–66. Kansas K-12 education expenditures
from state, federal and local sources in the years preceding and during the Montoy litigation
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Richard E. Levy has artfully described how the Montoy saga and the Court’s
interactions with lawmakers involved “a clash between two essential separationof-powers principles,” involving the legislature’s power to set educational policy and control taxes on the one hand, and the duty of the courts to interpret and
apply the law on the other.186 Although the judiciary relied on the legislature’s
own standards and definitions in reaching its conclusions,187 many lawmakers
felt the court was usurping their power to oversee and manage the school system188 and responded with unsuccessful proposals to amend the Kansas constitution to trim the Supreme Court’s authority to direct the legislature to make
appropriations.189
The Montoy litigation closed with judicial acceptance of the legislature’s
progress in boosting school funding. To this end, Richard Levy observed in a
footnote that the title of his article—which included an allusion to the historic
gunfight at the OK Corral—was somewhat misplaced because everyone was
still standing at the end of the heated litigation.190 But as it turned out, the gunfight was not over at all; within four short years the guns would resume their
blazing once more.
After Montoy, two things happened that caused school funding cuts and renewed litigation. First, the “Great Recession” of 2007–2009 drastically reduced
government revenues nationwide—an unfortunate phenomenon from which
Kansas was by no means immune.191 Second, conservative Republicans defeated moderates in the 2010 and 2012 state primaries and a conservative Governor was elected.192 Legislative cuts to the education budget resulted in a 2.61%
decrease in per pupil funding from all sources in the 2009–2010 school year
when compared with the prior year.193 The next year saw much of the same, as
per pupil funding was once again slashed.194 This resulted in Gannon v. State,
filed in November 2010 by a group of school districts, their students, and their
guardians.195
The Gannon case was referred to a panel of three trial judges, as required
are available in a report, State Totals All USDS, available from the Kansas State Dept. of Educ.,
Div. Fiscal & Admin. Services, KSDE Data Central, https://perma.cc/2JDD-LKF6.
186 Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral, supra note 170, at 1048–49.
187 Id. at 1070, 1078.
188 Id. at 1082, 1084
189 Id. at 1085–86, 1093–97.
190 Id. at 1095, footnote 358.
191 See History.com Eds., Great Recession (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.history.com/topic
s/21st-century/recession.
192 Levy, The War of Judicial Independence, supra note 170 at 730–31.
193 Kansas State Dept. of Educ., Div. Fiscal & Admin. Services, KSDE Data Central, State
Totals All USDS, https://datacentral.ksde.org/school_finance_reports.aspx (last visited June
28, 2019); 2008–2009 to 2017–2018 Report available at: https://perma.cc/6SW2-9PUA.
194 Id.
195 Robb et al., The Current State of School Finance, supra note 170, at 337.
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by a Kansas statute on school funding litigation.196 Following a marathon, sixteen-day trial, the panel held that the state was violating the Article VI funding
requirements.197 Upon review, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling. Responding to the state’s argument that the level of school funding was a non-justiciable political question, the opinion discussed at length the
fundamental duties of the judicial branch. It noted that the majority of state
courts had held the constitutionality of school funding was justiciable, and went
on to emphasize that “our Kansas Constitution clearly leaves to the legislature
the myriad of choices available to perform its constitutional duty; but when the
question becomes whether the legislature has actually performed its duty, that
most basic question is left to the courts to answer under our system of checks
and balances.”198
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court explicitly adopted Kentucky’s
factors from the 1989 case Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.199 for evaluating the constitutional adequacy of K–12 financing.200 After adopting the factors articulated by Rose, the Court sent the “adequacy” portion of the case back
to the district court for further evaluation in light of the newly endorsed criteria.201 The court also found that the legislature had violated the “equitable education” requirement of the state constitution because of the disparities between
rich and poor districts,202 and ordered the legislature to address the equity issue
Ch. 194, 2005 Kan. Sess. Laws, codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. §72-5633 (2017).
Luke Gannon and Grace Gannon by their Next Friends and Guardians, et al., Shawnee
Co. Dist. Ct. Case No. 10C1569 (Jan. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/JBP8-J8DJ.
198 Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1226.
199 Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989).
200 Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1236–37. In recounting the “Rose factors,” the Gannon I court
quoted the Kentucky supreme court as follows:
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and
every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral
and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex
and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices;
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and
nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental
and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient
training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 170 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
201 Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1237.
202 Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1243.
196
197
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no later than July 1, 2014.203
What followed was five years of back-and-forth institutional dialogue and
action between the Kansas Supreme Court and the coordinate branches of government. The sequence of events differed from Indonesia’s and Washington’s
experience in its details, though many of the same basic themes were clearly
observable. In this regard, it is truly striking how similar the big-picture story
was in each jurisdiction: court decisions requiring increased school funding
were followed by legislative action that fell short of the constitutional requirement. The inter-branch tension was even stronger in Kansas than in Indonesia
or Washington. Some legislators complained vociferously that their authority
was being usurped by the judiciary.204 In 2015, a conservative legislature and
governor froze the state’s commitment of funds to local districts and backtracked on school levy equalization actions taken in 2014 with lower court approval.205 Legislators adopted a new “block grant” system for state aid to districts. But in February 2016, the Court rejected that approach in Gannon II,
where the Court was forced to explain to lawmakers that the school funding
requirements originated with the people, whose will was expressed in a constitution that courts were bound to enforce.206 The opinion also emphasized that
the judiciary not only had the power declare a law unconstitutional, but also “the
inherent power to enforce our holdings.”207 Nevertheless, the court stayed action
to provide the legislature with an opportunity to correct the deficiencies.
The legislature responded by restoring the earlier formula for state capital
aid and new equalization assistance.208 But on May 27, 2016, the Court quickly
ruled in Gannon III209 that although the legislature had made some progress in
the capital funding area, certain inequities were accentuated and the legislation
had still failed to comply with the Gannon I order.210 The Court stayed the issuance of a mandate until June 30, 2016, to provide lawmakers with another opportunity to “to craft a constitutionally suitable solution.”211 Lawmakers in a
special session provided additional equalization funds, and the state and Gannon
plaintiffs stipulated that the constitutional equity issues were resolved. The
Court promptly approved that agreement, leaving the adequacy issues for later
resolution.212

Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1250–52.
Hoeven, supra note 170, at 420–21.
205 These events are detailed in Gannon II, 368 P.3d 1024, 1032–35 (Kan. 2016). See also
Hoeven, Kansas Public School Funding, supra note 170, at 420–21.
206 Gannon II, 368 P.3d at 1057.
207 Id.
208 Ch. 45, 2016 Kan. Sess. Laws.
209 372 P.3d 1181.
210 Gannon III, 372 P.3d at 1197–98.
211 Gannon III, 372. P.3d at 1204.
212 Robb et al., The Current State of School Finance, supra note 170, at 340.
203
204
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The firm stance of the judiciary in the first Gannon cases highlighted the
tension between the Kansas Supreme Court and many political actors.213 This
led to a frontal attack on the Court, as a number of conservative groups challenged the retention of four out of five justices in the November 2016 election.214
However, a coalition of moderate Republicans, Democrats, businesses, and proschool groups backed the Court, and all the justices were retained with solid
voter support.215 This strong showing for the justices echoed Washington’s judicial election results the same year and provided important institutional capital
for the Kansas Supreme Court as it moved into the next rounds of Gannon.216
The March 2017 case, Gannon IV,217 focused on the issue of funding adequacy, holding that the most recent group of legislative changes were only “minimally responsive.”218 In June of that year, the legislature responded with the
“Kansas School Equity and Enhancement Act” (KSEEA) aimed at comprehensively changing the school funding system.219 The same legislature also changed
the state’s income tax structure to increase revenue available for critical needs,
including school operations.220 In October, the Kansas Supreme Court responded with Gannon V,221 holding that the KSEEA exacerbated wealth-based
disparities among school districts222 and contributed to the further entrenchment
of school underfunding.223 Nevertheless, the Court stayed its mandate through
June 30, 2018 in order to enable the legislature to adjust the state’s funding
mechanisms.224 This process was repeated again the following year with some
progress; the 2018 legislature increased funding based on a new cost study.225
In Gannon VI,226 the Court complemented lawmakers on the improvement and
determined that the equity issues were finally resolved.227 However, the justices
informed legislators that additional timely financial adjustments were necessary

Levy, The War of Judicial Independence, supra note 170, at 735.
Ballotpedia, Kansas Supreme Court Elections, 2016, https://ballotpedia.org/Kansas_Supreme_Court_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/2B2Q-Z5FK] (last visited July 1,
2019).
215 Id.
216 Telephone Interview with Richard E. Levy, J.B. Smith Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Kansas School of Law (Sept. 26, 2018).
217 Gannon IV, 390 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2017).
218 Gannon IV, 390 P. 3d at 468, 488.
219 Ch. 95, 2017 Kan. Sess. Laws 908. See also, Hoeven, Kansas Public School Funding,
supra note 170, at 424–27.
220 Ch. 84, 2017 Kan. Sess. Laws 823.
221 Gannon V, 402 P.3d 513 (Kan. 2017).
222 Gannon V, 402 P.3d at 549.
223 Gannon V, 402 P.3d at 539.
224 Gannon V, 402 P.3d at 518.
225 Hoeven, Kansas Public School Funding, supra note 170 at 428–29.
226 Gannon VI, 420 P.3d 477 (2018).
227 Gannon VI, 420 P.3d at 494.
213
214
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to satisfy the constitution’s adequacy requirements.228
As we saw in the Washington judicial elections discussed earlier, the 2016
Kansas retention election results had strengthened the Court’s hand in the push
for final resolution of the Gannon cases. The 2018 election similarly helped propel a final financial resolution. That year, voters opted for Democratic Governor
Laura Kelly, whose election campaign stressed the need to resolve school funding litigation and comply with the Kansas Supreme Court’s requirements.229 Despite resistance from house Republicans, Governor Kelly worked with a bipartisan coalition of senators to push through a funding package meant to finally
end the Gannon saga.230 After an oral argument in which the justices expressed
their frustration with the seemingly interminable litigation,231 Gannon VII, issued in June 2019, found the state to be in substantial compliance with the state
constitution’s adequacy requirements.232 The Court retained jurisdiction “to ensure continued implementation of the scheduled funding.”233
In attempting to achieve legislative compliance with its constitutional decisions on school funding, the Kansas Supreme Court faced the same challenges
as the courts in Indonesia and Washington. Applying Young’s typology, the
Kansas justices leaned toward a “managerial” approach, defining the character
of the constitutional right and setting timelines for legislative implementation.
At the same time, the Court would suggest potential measures in its consideration to enforce compliance, before backing off and allowing the legislature more
time to voluntarily comply—knowing that the legislators now had the alternative of judicially enforced compliance in the back of their mind. Richard E.
Levy’s view is that the Court gradually improved its tactical skills, moving from
an approach that Young would characterize as a peremptory approach in Montoy, to what we might view as a managerial stance in the Gannon cases.234 In
Gannon, the court often referred to legislatively-sponsored cost studies and emphasized less absolute expenditure levels, allowing for good faith attempts at

Gannon VI, 420 P.3d at 485.
Stephen Koranda, Relieved to Have a School Funding Plan, Kansas Lawmakers Await
the Court, KCUR 89.3 RADIO, April 5, 2019, https://www.kcur.org/post/relieved-have-schoolfunding-plan-kansas-lawmakers-await-court#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/KFD7-Z8Z2] (last
visited July 1, 2019).
230 Id. See also, Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Gov. Kelly and House GOP Clash on School
Funding as Deadline Approaches, WICHITA EAGLE (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.kansas.com/
news/politics-government/article228377219.html [https://perma.cc/Q3U3-KBU2] (last visited July 1, 2019).
231 Stephen Koranda & Celia Llopis-Jepsen, Can We End the School Litigation Now? That
and More Questions from the Kansas Supreme Court, KCUR 89.3 Radio, May 9, 2019,
https://www.kcur.org/post/can-we-end-school-litigation-now-and-more-questions-kansas-su
preme-court#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/G4SJ-9CLA] (last visited July 1, 2019).
232 Gannon VII, 443 P.3d 294 (Kan. June 14, 2019).
233 Id.
234 Levy interview, supra note 216.
228
229
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resolution of the issue by the legislative branch. Even after the 2016 election
victories, the Kansas Supreme Court continued to prod the legislature—doing
so firmly but without engaging in a peremptory approach that might result in
stiffened and counterproductive legislative resistance.

VII. OBERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In each of the three jurisdictions examined—Indonesia, Washington State,
and Kansas—constitutional positive rights provisions were the basis of lengthy
but successful litigation that substantially increased governmental funding of
pre-college education. The tables below depict the gradual but substantial increase in school funding over the course of the observed court cases.
Education Funding Increases During Litigation
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Kansas 2009-2019 (Gannon Cases)
$12,000.00
$10,000.00
$8,000.00
$6,000.00
$4,000.00
$2,000.00
$-

$6,326

$6,983

2009-10
School Year
(Gannon Filed)

2012-13
(Gannon II)

$8,706

$9,086

$9,234

2016-17
(Gannon II)

2017-18
(Gannon V)

2018-19
(Gannon VI)

State Per Pupil Expenditures

Perhaps the most noteworthy adjective to stress with regard to the above
increases is gradual. Significant increases in state resources for education were
achieved, but in each jurisdiction, executive and legislative actors did not jump
to attention and immediately implement constitutional court rulings. As the
judges in these cases were acutely aware, there was a “delicate balancing of
powers and responsibilities among coordinate branches of government,”235 and
Opinion of the Court by Debra Stephens, J., in Mathew McCleary et al., v. State of
Washington, 173 Wn.2d 477, 540, 269 P.3d 227, 258 (2012). See supra notes 141–50 and
accompanying text.
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there was certainly no guarantee the political actors would follow judicial directives.
Through the course of the examined litigation, the justices in these jurisdictions tried most of the approaches Young’s work describes.236 Young’s typologies are useful in depicting the ways courts act when addressing positive rights
enforcement. In her book, she describes what she sees as the predominant characteristics of the national courts she studied: a “catalytic” South African court,
a “supremacist” bench in Columbia, an “engaged” Indian court, and a tendency
towards “detachment” in the United Kingdom.237 She also observes that judicial
power is multidimensional and interactive,238 and this squares with our observations. We observed the Indonesian, Washington, and Kansas courts toggling
back and forth between stances and modes. These courts would start out with
one approach. Then, when legislators either ignored or responded slowly to the
initial juridical modality, the courts would try something else—on occasion
openly querying the parties about the content and limits of a court’s enforcement
powers.239 Gradually the coordinate branches increased school budgets to levels
that satisfied the reviewing courts. In part a testimony to the finitude of human
perseverance in continued litigation, the courts and legislatures eventually tired
of the endless litigative process and were willing to declare the school funding
issued “solved” when the increases were sufficient enough.
Based on the right-to-education-funding cases we studied, we found that
Katharine Young’s model is most helpful in describing multiple modes of constitutional court behavior in a politicized environment in which, regardless of
judicial selection method, the justices were subject to removal either by the executive or by the voters. But the social scientists are especially helpful in explaining the ultimate success of these positive rights cases. Gauri and Brinks are
right that judges “craft their opinions with an eye on the likelihood of compliance . . . , the political reaction and its effect on the standing of the judiciary.”240
Further, the legal, political, socioeconomic, and civil society variables described
by Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi help explain the interactions when
the judicial branch interfaces with its coordinate branches in positive rights situations.241 As to the germane legal variables, the strong language of the relevant
rights provisions was quite significant. In terms of political and social variables,
the Indonesian legislature was constrained by limited resources, while the two
American legislatures were constrained first by a recession and then by a simple
See supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text (discussing the four types of court modalities).
238 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the exercise of judicial power as
“multidimensional” and “interactive”).
239 See, e.g., supra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the prodding of petitioners
by the Washington Supreme Court in a case involving sanctions against the state).
240 GAURI & BRINKS, supra note 2 at 4.
241 See LANGFORD ET AL, supra note 3 and text accompanying supra notes 16–17.
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unwillingness to raise taxes. Likewise, the civil society variables were not unimportant: in all three jurisdictions the petitioners were backed financially and
politically by education advocacy groups and unions, and the cases would likely
not have succeeded without that crucial support. This was especially true in
Washington and Kansas, where this increased support urged sympathetic legislators to collaborate strategically across party lines and with the case petitioners.
Notwithstanding the political, social, and economic variables that affect judicial decision-making, the fact remains that most judges are not politicians.
Whether judges come from a civil law or common law background, their culture
is a legal rather than a political culture. While certainly interconnected, the respective milieus of jurists and politicians are by no means the same. Judges focus on one case after another, considering and responding to technical legal arguments raised by the parties and issuing decisions based on legal doctrines.
They are accustomed to making decisions, issuing rulings, and having their orders followed. When faced with strong, explicit education rights provisions (as
in Indonesia and Washington State) or a moderately strong provision reinforced
by a robust corpus of legal doctrine (as in Kansas, relying in large part on their
endorsement of Kentucky law), their institutional and cultural background impels them to behave as judges, not politicians. This lays the groundwork for interbranch tension. Based on his study of the Kansas school finance cases, Richard E. Levy has observed that “there is an inherent cultural clash between courts
and legislators: lawmakers are politicians and are looking for what is do-able
and expedient, while courts apply principled deductive reasoning based on constitutional norms, reasoning that leads to conclusions about actions that the
judges expect to be carried out.”242
The legal variables described by Langford, Rodriguez-Garavito, and Rossi
are the ones with the most salience for judges: the wording of the constitutional
language; the arguments presented by litigants; the traditions of a jurisdiction’s
specific judicial culture; and the available remedies.243 Needless to say, the practicable remedies are often difficult for judges to discern, particularly when the
vindication of a particular positive right requires the expenditure of money that
is perennially in short supply. Education is expensive. Substantial increases in
school funding require either increased tax revenue or cuts to other government
programs. Elected officials are uncomfortable raising taxes and they cannot rely
on their economies to consistently generate more revenue without rate increases.
Of course, judges neither desire nor are well-equipped to make policy trade-offs.
They are most comfortable operating in their natural, legalistic, deductive reasoning track, and that approach is not suited to the give-and-take of governing
by compromise. In the jurisdictions and cases observed for this paper, each constitutional court concentrated on legal reasoning and explanations in formal
Levy interview, supra note 216.
See LANGFORD ET AL., SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS, supra note 3 and text accompanying
notes 16–17 (defining the four groups of variables of offering examples of each in praxis).
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opinions, while keeping an eye on the practicalities of enforcement and implementation. Members of the Washington Supreme Court have observed that as
judges, they are reactive, responding to actions and solutions proposed by the
parties; in the McCleary case the court acted cautiously and methodically because the plaintiffs did not propose drastic judicial actions and because the State
gradually responded.244
It is fair to say that in all three of the jurisdictions studied, the constitutional
courts were “catalytic” as Young uses the term. The constitutional school funding cases in Indonesia, Washington, and Kansas were all launched by teachers’
unions and education organizations, groups that could simultaneously support
lawsuits and lobby legislatures to promote compliance with court rulings. Those
efforts were complemented by support from the media and, in the cases of Washington and Kansas, by voters at the polls. Consistent with the social scientists’
theories, we found that despite legislative foot-dragging, these catalytic courts
forced education funding to remain at the top of the legislative agenda while
education interest groups and the media successfully pushed the lawmakers to
find the money so they could eventually comply with the court orders.
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See Interviews with Washington Supreme Court Justices, supra note 152.

